by Matthew Rusling

    WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 (Xinhua) -- Gaps are emerging between the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and its implementation in towns and villages across the embattled nation.

    While U.S. plans make sense on paper, ground personnel are running into unexpected snags that hamper operations, said David Kilcullen, an incoming advisor to Gen. Stanley McCrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan.

    With the U.S. role in Iraq coming to a close, the United States has shifted its focus to the war in Afghanistan. U.S. forces are slated to reach 68,000 by year-end, more than double the 32,000 troops at the end of last year.

    The switch comes with a much-touted new strategy that emphasizes gaining support from ordinary Afghans and minimizing Taliban influence in the war-torn country. One of the plan's major tenets is "clear, hold, build" -- troops "clear" an area of insurgents, "hold" the location and conduct economic development projects in order to "build" the economy and gain Afghan loyalty.

    Speaking Thursday at the Washington, D.C.-based U.S. Institute of Peace, Kilcullen said those efforts are not working. British forces there, he noted, have equated such operations to "mowing the lawn" -- Taliban forces return after being cleared, just as grass grows back after being cut.

    And in many cases the strategy has backfired, endangering locals who emerged to help U.S. forces develop the area, he said. Once the troops withdraw, the Taliban returns and kills them, assisted by the eyes and ears of smaller cells of Taliban-linked villagers who intimidate local leaders.

    "If you can't stay in an area, its better not to go in at all," Kilcullen said, adding that at least that will keep people alive.

    The United States also fails to distinguish between "insurgents" and "the insurgency," Kilcullen said. All too often, the war is "enemy-centric" and U.S. forces are focused on stamping out the bad guys while overlooking the causes of instability.

    Andrew Wilder, research director at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, who also spoke at Thursday's event, said the strategy is missing a viable political solution. Planners lack a clear vision of what type of state they wish to create and Afghanistan's centralized government does not reflect the country's myriad of tribal and local interests.

    Many Afghans perceive their government as corrupt, he said, which bodes ill for U.S. efforts to sway support away from the Taliban.

    Also problematic is the lack of cultural knowledge and language skills among some provincial reconstruction teams -- teams of military and civilian personnel engaged in development. Kilcullen told an anecdote of one team that launched an initiative -- promoted as a gift from America -- to equip villages with portable electricity generators.

    Despite good intentions, the project became mired in strife and marred locals' relationship with the U.S. team, he said.

    The issue was finally resolved, but the anecdote shows that "cookie cutter" approaches are ineffective and that solutions must be local, he said.

    Similar projects are likely to ramp up, as the budget for foreign assistance is expected to grow five fold over the next five years, Kilcullen noted. But the question remains whether the USAID -- the U.S. organization responsible for most non-military foreign aid -- can handle the coming "tsunami of cash," he said.

    The U.S. strategy also assumes that building infrastructure will earn support from Afghans. That notion is mirrored by large-scale road construction efforts designed to boost the economy by linking rural areas with urban marketplaces. Wilder noted, however, that new roads are no panacea and could increase Taliban mobility.

    Construction projects, which are supposed to help develop the private sector, have been marred by corruption, Wilder said. Afghan contractors collude to rig the bidding process and sometimes murder competitors, he said.

    Policing is also a concern. While the U.S. goal is to hand over security duties to Afghan forces, ordinary Afghans perceive their police as corrupt, Wilder said.

    "I don't see how increasing the number of bad police is going to improve the situation," he said.

    Having just returned from a trip to Afghanistan, Wilder said some villagers requested that U.S. forces not send Afghan police to hold areas cleared of Taliban. Although policing has improved in some districts, "we have a lot more work to do," Wilder said.

    Kilcullen said Afghans are loath to report crimes to local police, as they are afraid of being beaten up for bothering the officers.

    Not everyone, however, shares such views and a number of experts have expressed optimism over U.S. efforts to wrest the country from the Taliban's grip.

    Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, said locals will side with the United States if they see a rise in economic opportunities.

    And road construction -- whether it aids Taliban mobility or not -- is one way to make inroads with local farmers, as it will ease their trips to urban markets and boost their income, he said.

    Other positive moves are Gen. McCrystal's instructions to balance the need for air support with avoiding civilian casualties and collateral damage, experts said.

    A new U.S. presidential administration committed to success, as well as U.S. President Barack Obama's retention of Defense Secretary Robert Gates, will bode well for U.S. efforts, Krepinevich said.

    Kilcullen said the war is still winnable, but it will take up to two more years of fighting and an additional three years to hand over security duties to Afghan forces.

    Wilder expressed pessimism but said he was not ready to throw in the towel and added that there is some effort to address shortcomings.

    The stakes are high, and allowing Afghanistan to fall to the Taliban could give al-Qaeda operatives a foothold in nuclear armed Pakistan, said Kilcullen.