Special Report: Barack Obama: The 44th U.S. President

    by Hadi Mayar

    KABUL, April 1 (Xinhua) -- No president of the United States in recent years was so candid and clear in his vision as was Barack Obama when, on March 27, he announced his administration's new policy for Afghanistan -- and now also for Pakistan.

    "I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent its return to either country in the future," Obama said, while charting out the revised U.S. strategy in the war on terror, now mostly referred to by U.S. officials as 'overseas contingency operation.'

    The main features of the new U.S. strategy are its comprehensive nature and regional perspective. Under this strategy, the issue of Islamic militancy is to be addressed through military, political, economic, and administrative measures: All these steps are, though, the same, which the Bush administration had been taking over the previous years in Afghanistan, yet the difference this time is that they have been harmonized with each other in a comprehensive and coordinated strategy.

    Previously, while the U.S. and NATO forces were busy in military operations to stem the Taliban uprising, Afghanistan's reconstruction, strengthening of the state authority, curbing of drug trafficking, and handling of the problem of Islamic extremism in Pakistan's north-western parts, were important in their own right -- having nothing to do with the military aspect. These all measures would, however, now go hand in hand while the U.S., NATO, and UN agencies would coordinate with each others to ensure optimum output.

    Similarly, the stress this time is to deprive the Afghan Taliban of the moral, military, and financial support, which they presumably receive from the rugged terrain between Pakistan and Afghanistan. As Obama's claims, it is at the al-Qaeda and Taliban bases in these areas that 'more attacks against the United States are being planned.' These bases are, therefore, to be wiped out at all costs.

    Pakistan's concern with regard to the expansion of the drone attacks, presently carried out in the country's semi-independent tribal areas, to other parts of the country has, though, been conceded, yet Islamabad has been taxed with more tangible actions to curb militancy on its soil. Washington would only provide training, equipment, and intelligence tips to the Pakistani security forces.

    In lieu, Pakistan will receive more financial assistance while its arch adversary, India, will be persuaded to avoid steps that can ignite hostilities between the two nuclear armed countries.

    To enlist the support of regional countries -- including that of Iran, which otherwise has a history of hostility with the United States and other Western countries -- is yet another attribute of the new strategy. It now remains to be seen whether these all countries share the U.S. concern -- and to what extent.

    Inside Afghanistan, the new strategy envisages steps to separate and isolate the 'hardcore' insurgents from what U.S. intelligence input describes as 70 percent comparatively reconcilable Taliban. These militants of the outer fringes of the Taliban movement would be contacted through Afghanistan's central government and local community leaders.

    While U.S. and NATO forces will target the hardcore Taliban in the short run, a long term strategy has been drawn out to raise 1,34,000-strong Afghan army and 80,000-strong Afghanistan national police. Besides the 17,000 fresh U.S. soldiers, 4,000 more would be sent this year to build the capacity of Afghan security forces for meeting the Taliban challenge.

    Further more, stringent steps would be taken to end poppy cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan, which, according to Western media reports, constitutes the major portion of Taliban's financial support.

    The new plan also contemplates steps to ensure good governance in Afghanistan by stamping out graft in the administration and consolidating the central government's writ in the provinces.

    Another proposed step in the new strategy contemplates strengthening of the Afghan economy for which the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other Western and UN agencies would be required to strengthen agriculture infrastructure in the landlocked barren terrain.

    Cognizant of the intensity of insurgency -- which made Afghanistan see its bloodiest year in the 2008 -- a cohesive civil-military partnership has been insisted with a call for the NATO and UN allies to share Washington's pivotal responsibility in ensuring that Afghanistan does not fall back into the 'dark age' of Taliban and al-Qaeda rule.

    Regional analysts feel that if the U.S. State Department effectively executes its part of the effort, the new strategy can, at least, help contain terrorism and insurgency, through a collective will and regional support.

    However, while hoping for the better, the United States and NATO must remain prepared for the worse, as Islamic militancy has a strong ideological base and financial back-up.