BEIJING, May 30 (Xinhua) -- A newly-published book said that a U.S. clandestine plan on air raiding China's first nuclear weapon facilities 42 years ago forced Chinese leaders to alter the nation's economic development strategy.

    The book on the modern Chinese economy revealed that the country thus had to hide its economic muscles in remote southwestern mountains to avoid the strikes.

    The sudden change of economic development strategy, which governed all the national economic plans from 1966 to 1970, was a fact revealed by an academic book titled The Research Report on China's Ten Five-Year Plans, which was issued by China's top think tank, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) here Tuesday.

    The book was compiled by prominent economist Liu Guoguang and another handful of elite economists from the CASS.

    The book said, after a careful study of international situations, Chairman Mao Zedong masterminded to change the agreed Third Five-Year Plan (1966-70) from focusing on improving people's livelihood to preparing an all-out war against the "imperialists", particularly the United States.

    In bailing Chinese people out of economic hardship resulting from big famines in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the central leadership, steered by Chairman Mao, previously decided to reinvigorate the sluggish national economy in the five years between 1966 and 1970. The priority tasks should be, according to authoritative documents, to address the basic problems of shortage of food, clothes and other daily consumption goods for the people.

    However, the book said, the judgment about the world affairs and the war-scenario consideration made Mao change the consensus-based proposal on enhancing the fragile economy.

    The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1960 ascertained the Chinese covert mission of developing nuclear weapons. The CIA estimated the first fission reactor in China would be completed by1961 and produce plutonium as early as 1962. As figuring out that the Chinese would likely detonate their first atom bomb in 1964, the U.S. intelligence community suggested to suddenly strike the Chinese nuclear facilities, including nuclear reactors churning out weapon-grade materials and experiment sites, in the land-locked Lop Nur.

    According to a declassified top-secret document datelined on Dec. 14, 1964, and written by George G. Rathjens of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. decision-makers seriously appraised possibility of "overt non-nuclear air attack."

    "'Relatively heavy' non-nuclear air attack would be required to destroy fissionable material production facilities to the degree that essentially complete rebuilding would be required," the document said.

    "A question is raised as to how effective a job could be done with various alternative levels of attack," it said.

    After precise calculation, the U.S. foreign policy team agreed,"We are not in favor of unprovoked unilateral U.S. military action against Chinese nuclear installations at this time. We would prefer to have a Chinese test take place than to initiate such action now," a declassified memo to President Lyndon B. Johnson said.

    "If for other reasons we should find ourselves in military hostilities at any level with the Chinese Communists, we would expect to give very close attention to the possibility of an appropriate military action against Chinese nuclear facilities," it said.

    On Oct. 16, 1964, China blasted off the first atom bomb in Lop Nur.

    Although the impending U.S. strike on Chinese nuclear facilities was not realized, the Chinese central leadership made its mind anyway to move vital economic capabilities to remote inland areas.

    Mao and his close associates obviously knew the Damocles sword hung over national security of China.

    In the early 1960s, China's 14 metropolises, each of which had over one million population, gathered more than 60 percent of machinery production, 50 percent of chemical production, and 52 percent of defense industry production. Most of the 14 metropolises and 20 key cities, with populations ranging from 500,000 to one million, were near coastal areas which are vulnerable to military attacks.

    After the economic planning adjustment, the government arrange dimportant factories, universities and confidential governmental organs to move to southwest China. Those organizations were relocated and scattered to covered places at mountainside.

    Chairman Mao ordered to make full preparation for a possible large-scale war and even considered building the world's highest railroad from Qinghai to Tibet, which was halted at that time but reconsidered in the early 2000s.

    Economists, however, said the readjustment of national economic planning in 1964 inadvertently set a solid basis for latest endeavors to revitalize economy in the west. Enditem