BEIJING, Jan. 24 -- At a time when the right to develop is perceived as a human right, every country is entitled to develop, just as every person needs to breathe. Nothing is controversial about the term "development," but what about the adjective "peaceful?" There are two questions people have asked: 1. Does China want to be peaceful? 2. If it does, do the challenges the country faces leave room for reaching its goals through exclusively peaceful means?

    These two questions about peace are most acutely reflected in the Taiwan question as it involves the biggest risk of military conflict among all of China's challenges. That is why any discussion of peaceful development should give top priority to the cross-Straits relationship.

    When it comes to China's policy, just as President Hu Jintao said, China wants to resolve the Taiwan question through peaceful means more than anyone else. In the past year, Beijing has either unilaterally adopted measures or consulted Taipei to ease tensions and promote bilateral exchanges. In early 2005, two-way charter flights were made possible during the Spring Festival holidays. Negotiations will lead to further easing of restrictions related to passenger identity and the origins of flights for the 2006 Spring Festival.

    In February, Sun Yafu, vice-minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, and Li Yafei, secretary-general of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, paid homage at the funeral of Koo Chen-fu as representatives of Wang Daohan. This was a form of "officials in the guise of non-officials," an addition to the previous form of "non-officials taking the place of officials."

    Subsequently, pan-blue leaders such as Lien Chan, James Soong and Yok Mu-ming came to visit the mainland and established mechanisms for inter-party communications with the Chinese Communist Party. The mainland announced its offer to give Taiwan a pair of giant pandas as a goodwill gift, and adopted a series of measures such as zero-tariff imports of Taiwan-grown fruits, employment rights for Taiwan students and protection for Taiwan businessmen by setting up a complaints bureau.

    As for the one-China principle, the mainland holds the view of "one China, no interpretation," which means, one China but without discussion of its political connotation; the Kuomintang (KMT) stands for "one China, different interpretations," meaning, one China but each side gives its own interpretations; the People First Party has "two sides of the Straits, one China." Beijing accepts both of these wordings, which is a gesture of goodwill.

    As for the pan-green camp, Beijing also seeks ways to bring about change through reconciliation. President Hu made a swift response on March 4 when Taiwan leader Chen Shui-bian reiterated during his meeting with James Soong his "four no's and one not" pledge and his promise not to push for independence through "constitutional" reform.

    To preserve peace and stability along the Taiwan Straits, China has strengthened co-operation with the international community, which includes that with the United States to prevent "Taiwan independence." The Chinese Government proclaimed its policy of peaceful development. This is a pledge with certain self-restraining pressure for solving the Taiwan question peacefully. The fact that China can work with the US on an issue it has always emphasized as "China's internal issue" is testament to the Chinese Government's sincerity to preserve the region's peace and stability.

    But it is not just down to the mainland to achieve that goal. If the Taiwan authorities insist on seeking independence, they will set the time bomb ticking that will destroy the prospect of peaceful development. It is comforting that recent years of joint efforts have increased positive elements that may contain activities related to "Taiwan independence." The following are some of the manifestations of these elements:

    First, after the visits of Lien and Soong to the mainland, the pan-blue camp won out in the end-of-2005 local government chief elections. This showed the majority of the Taiwanese public is at least not opposed to the pan-blue camp's endeavour to improve cross-Straits relations. Public opinion took a new direction to make "reconciliation and mutual benefit" the new mainstream thought.

    Second, as of November 2005, there had been 4.3 million visitors from Taiwan to the mainland for family visits, tourism and business. Meanwhile, bilateral trade reached US$91.23 billion in 2005, giving Taiwan a trade surplus of US$58.13 billion. All this has made more people on the island realize that "Taiwan independence" is not in their best interests nor in accord with the trend of cross-Straits economic integration. Even though the Taiwan authorities pushed for "de-Sinofication," many Taiwan businesses, including large ones, kept travelling to the mainland. In Taiwanese society, where elections are popular, the influence of the business community should not be underestimated, and the turnaround of leading corporate leaders may help restrict those seeking "Taiwan independence."

    Third, the international community is reluctant to cross the bottom line of China's opposition towards "Taiwan independence," which constitutes a large background inauspicious to pro-independence forces. The United States, after years of wavering on its Taiwan policy, has made clear its stand to co-operate with Beijing in opposing "Taiwan independence." The American message has proven to be negative for pro-independence members as the American aid they had been anticipating has been turned into American restraint.

    Fourth, the pan-green camp has shown new directions of thinking internally. Some have proposed stronger trade links with the mainland; others mentioned that "constitutions on both sides of the Straits share the framework of one China." After the Democratic Progressive Party suffered a setback in last year's local government elections, many party members asked Chen Shui-bian to shoulder responsibility for the defeat, which undermined Chen's domination over the island's political situation.

    As shown above, positive factors are on the rise, and with common efforts by the Chinese people on both sides of the Straits, we are cautiously optimistic about the prospect of mutually creating an environment of beneficial interaction and peaceful development across the Straits.

    But it must be pointed out that the undercurrents of danger still exist. Chen Shui-bian will not easily accept failure. His New Year's Day speech was an act of comeback that he had meticulously designed. The pro-independence forces still have a lot of power and the DPP has not gone through fundamental changes. Therefore, the fight against "Taiwan independence" will be complicated, and may last a long time.

    The author is a professor at Renmin University of China.

    (Source: China Daily)