HARDLINE PRESIDENT AND IRAN'S DEFIANT RESUMPTION   

    In the election held in late June, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardliner and ultraconservative, surprisingly defeated AkbarHashemi Rafsanjani, former president and incumbent Expediency Council Chairman who seemed more pragmatic and open.  

    Though under laid by Tehran's loud claim on its consistency in nuclear policy, Ahmadinejad's victory and his cabinet's assumption of power in August turned to be a dividing ridge of the issue¡¯s development in 2005.

    The hard line president took over power on Aug. 3. Five days later, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities, a precursor to enrichment, and rejected a EU proposal of suspending enrichment delivered days ago.

    Tehran, defining the resumption as a previously and collectively adopted decision, resolutely rejected the repeated calls for re-suspending the conversion by the EU and the IAEA, saying that it would furthermore resume enrichment.  

    Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad appointed two of his hard line allies to hold the posts critical to the nuclear negotiation: Ali Larijanias Supreme National Security Council secretary and Manouchehr Mottaki as foreign minister.

    Larijani had defined the downright suspension in November 2004as "exchanging a pearl for a bonbon" and Mottaki had consistently criticized negotiators of the former cabinet for compromising too much.

    Soon after the formation of the new negotiating team, Iran manifested a re-orientation in its nuclear diplomacy, which was marked by the pursuit of support of countries like Russia, China, India, Pakistan and the Non-Alignment Movement members.  

    At an IAEA meeting in late September, the EU was forced to drop a motion on immediate referral of Iran's case to the UN Security Council and put it off to the agency's meeting of board of governors on Nov. 24 due to strong opposition of the above countries.

    During the two-month probation, Tehran remained similarly tough, rejecting the re-suspension and warning that it would cease all voluntary and confidence-building measures if the case was referred.

    What is more, the hard line cabinet in early November announced that it was prepared to replace some 40 ambassadors appointed by former government, including ambassadors to the European trio, which Tehran defined as routine rotations but failed to be convincing.