AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77

    Down south, American Airlines Flight 77 began its takeoff roll from Dulles International Airport outside Washington at 8:20. The flight was handed off routinely from Washington Center to Indianapolis Center at approximately 8:40.

    At 8:54, American 77 began deviating from its flight plan, first with a slight turn toward the south. Two minutes later it disappeared completely from Indianapolis radar. The controller tracking American 77 searched along its projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared.

    The controller tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the airline. Again there was nothing. At this point,the controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical and/or mechanical failure, and crashed.

    Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying otheragencies that American 77 was missing and had possibly crashed.

    At 9:08, Indianapolis Center contacted Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and told them to look out for a downed aircraft. At 9:09, they reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional center, which passed this information to FAA headquarters at 9:24.

    By 9:20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft in the system, and began to doubt their initial assumption that American 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Command Centerin Herndon prompted the Command Center to notify some FAA field facilities that American 77 was lost.

    Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponderwas turned off at 8:56. But for eight minutes and thirteen seconds,between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center. The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processedradar information, the report said.

    According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 re-emerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known position. The managers did not instruct other controllers to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.

    "While the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an 'all points bulletin' tosurrounding centers to search for primary radar targets," the report said.

    American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, DC. At 9:32, several of the Dulles controllers "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed." Reagan Airport controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft to identify the suspicious aircraft. The C-130H pilot spotted it, identified it as a Boeing 757, attempted to follow its path, and at 9:38, seconds after impact, reported to Washington Tower: "Looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon sir."

    After receiving a mistaken FAA information that American Airlines 11 was still airborne and heading toward Washington, the Mission Crew Commander at NEADS issued an order at 9:23 to scramble fighters at Langley Air Force Base. NEADS decided to keepthe Otis fighters over New York and send the Langley fighters to the Baltimore area, which was near Washington.

    NEADS contacted the FAA's Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS that American 77 was also missing. The time was 9:34.

    "This was the first notice to the military that American 77 wasmissing, and it had come by chance... No one at FAA Command Centeror headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77," the report said.

    At 9:36, the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and reported thatit had discovered an unidentified plane was just six miles southeast of the White House. The NEADS ordered the Langley fighters to fly to the White House. The fighters were approximately 150 miles away when the Pentagon was struck by American 77 at 9:37:46.

    UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93

    United 93 took off from Newark, New Jersey, at 8:42, after a delay of more than 40 minutes. At 9:28, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the controller. This was the last normal contactthe FAA had with United 93.

    Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin .. "

    The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?" This was followed by a second radio transmission, withsounds of screaming and someone yelling "Get out of here, get out of here," again from an unknown source.

    The Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions, and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet. The controller attempted again to contact United 93 several times, with no response.

    At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency: "Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board." The controller notified his supervisor, who passed the notice up the chain of command. By 9:34, word of the hijacking had reached FAA headquarters.

    FAA headquarters had by this time established an open line of communication with the Command Center at Herndon and instructed itto poll all the Centers about suspect aircraft. The Command Centerexecuted the request and, a minute later, Cleveland Center reported that "United 93 may have a bomb on board." That was the information Command Center relayed to FAA headquarters at 9:34.

    Between 9:34 and 9:38, the controller observed United 93 climbing to 40,700 feet and immediately moved several aircraft outof its way. The controller continued to try to contact United 93, and asked whether the pilot could confirm that he had been hijacked. There was no response.

    Then, at 9:39, a fifth radio transmission came over the radio frequency from United 93: "Uh, is the captain. Would like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport, and to have our demands [unintelligible]. Please remain quiet."

    At about 9:36, Cleveland Center offered to contact a nearby military base. Command Center replied that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make that decision and were working the issue.

    At 9:42, Command Center learned from television news reports that a plane had struck the Pentagon. The Command Center's National Operations Manager, Ben Sliney, ordered all FAA facilities to instruct all airborne aircraft to land at the nearest airport.

    "The air traffic control system handled it with great skill, asabout 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircraft soon landed without incident," the report said.

    United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03:11, 125 miles from Washington, DC.

    "Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one fromFAA headquarters requested military assistance regarding United 93.Nor did any manager at FAA headquarters pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military," the report said.

    NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center, at 10:07, unaware that the aircraft had already crashed. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground.