Intelligence report on Sept. 11 terrorist attacks issued

(December 12, 2002)

　　The U.S. joint Congressional committee investigating the Sept. 11 terrorist strikes issued a final report on Wednesday, December 11, 2002 sharply criticizing intelligence agencies for their failure to prevent the attacks on New York and the Pentagon.

    The U.S. joint Congressional committee investigating the Sept. 11 terrorist strikes issued a final report Wednesday sharply criticizing intelligence agencies for their failure to prevent the attacks on New York and the Pentagon.

　　But the panel did not go far enough for a leading member who issued a separate report identifying current and former senior officials who he said should be held accountable for the intelligence failures.

　　In a report that included findings about the government performance before Sept. 11 and recommendations for changes, the joint inquiry said stronger leadership was needed to improve coordination of the work of more than 12 military and civilian agencies that failed to share information before the attacks.

　　The report said that the agencies "missed opportunities to disrupt the Sept. 11 plot by denying entry to or detaining would-be hijackers; to at least try to unravel the plot through surveillance and other investigative work within the United States; and finally, to generate a heightened state of alert and thus harden the homeland against attack."

　　Although he said he supported the broad recommendations of the joint inquiry, the member who issued his own report, Senator Richard C. Shelby, Republican of Alabama, said he was disappointed that the panel did not assign personal responsibility for the failures to any individual senior officials.

　　He singled out the director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet; the director of the National Security Agency, Michael V. Hayden; the F.B.I. director who vacated his post in 2001, Louis J. Freeh; and other senior officials for failing to do more before Sept. 11.